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Faust Rossi
Editor’s Note: This account of the Scottsboro case, ap-
pearing in two parts and concluding in this issue of the
Cornell Law Forum, was derived from a summer 2001
Cornell Adult University class, Great American Trials,
that the author co-taught with Glenn C. Altschuler, the
Thomas and Dorothy Litwin Professor of American
Studies at Cornell.1
After being arrested for the alleged rape of two
white women in Alabama in 1931, the nine black
“Scottsboro Boys” were quickly convicted and
sentenced to die. The U.S. Supreme Court saved
the youths by overturning the convictions. But
now the Scottsboro nine would be retried, back in
Alabama where little had changed.
The American Communist Party (ACP) and its
legal arm, the International Labor Defense (ILD),
had done very well so far in their efforts on the
behalf of the defendants. But now they realized
that to make their case for capitalist racist oppres-
sion, they needed to show that the boys were
innocent; that is, to get an acquittal from an all-
white Alabama jury. It would require a superb,
maybe even a miraculous, defense. It is at this point
that a new savior emerged: Cornell Law School’s
own Samuel S. Leibowitz ’15. The ILD hired Mr.
Leibowitz, who by 1933 had become one of the
leading criminal lawyers in the nation, to represent
the Scottsboro defendants. Mr. Leibowitz was a 37-
year-old New York City trial attorney who had
defended murderers, organized crime figures like Al
Capone, and corrupt policemen. He was regarded
as “the next Clarence Darrow” and had an unbe-
lievable record of success. In 78 previous trials, he
had won 77 acquittals and one hung jury.
Mr. Leibowitz agreed to represent the
Scottsboro defendants without a fee. He was politi-
cally ambitious and believed that his reputation
would be greatly enhanced by this endeavor—more
so than by his previous successes in representing
nefarious clients. And he had a national stage. Mr.
Leibowitz made clear to the media that he was not
a communist, never would be a communist, and
that he disagreed with their philosophy. He was, he
said, taking the case for only one reason: justice.
Mr. Leibowitz deserved his outstanding reputa-
tion. He believed in thorough preparation and had
enormous skill as a litigator. He was a charismatic
and dominant figure in the courtroom. Of course,
no one is perfect, and some of Mr. Leibowitz’s
flaws proved costly. He, like many successful trial
lawyers, had a big ego. He was confident, some-
times overconfident. This ego, this overconfidence,
made him insensitive to risk. Some might say he
was naive. He was certain that he would secure
acquittals. He was sure that what worked for him
in New York would work equally well in Alabama.
He did not fully appreciate the enormity of his task
or the intensity of racial bias that opposed his ef-
forts. Mr. Leibowitz entered the fray with serious
disadvantages. He had been hired by the commu-
nists—not a plus. He was Jewish—not a plus in
1933 in the rural south. He was a northerner—not
a plus. He was representing black male youths
Above: The train’s
fireman giving
testimony during the
trial with Samuel S.
Leibowitz ’15, at right,
looking on.
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charged with defiling southern white womanhood,
and he was defending them in front of an all-white
jury—not a plus. He faced, in other words, three
forms of prejudice: racial, religious, and regional.
Nevertheless, Mr. Leibowitz had his great talent,
time for careful preparation, a well-financed inves-
tigation, a cause that was just, and one unexpected
stroke of luck: the judge assigned to the case re-
spected the rule of law. Perhaps, when all is said
and done, Judge James Edwin Horton was the
most heroic, most courageous figure in this
tragedy.
Judge Horton was, in this sense, another “sav-
ior” of the Scottsboro boys. Assigned to sit for the
retrials, Judge Horton was tall, thin,
Lincolnesque—and better educated than his peers
in the Alabama bar. He was the descendant of an
old Alabama family; gracious and relaxed, Judge
Horton almost never raised his voice and was well-
liked by everyone. There is no
doubt that Judge Horton was
steeped in southern traditions.
He accepted segregation, toler-
ated all-white juries, and
probably started out believing
that the defendants were guilty.
But above all, he was fair. He
believed in the law. He believed in the legal pro-
cess. He wasn’t famous. He wasn’t politically
ambitious. He was a judge to be proud of, as future
events would show.
Prejudice Trumps Justice
The first defendant selected to be tried was
Haywood Patterson. He looked to southern eyes to
be the meanest, most fierce-looking of the accused.
Appearing for the prosecution was the attorney
general of Alabama, Thomas Knight. It is unusual
for a state’s attorney general to be the one who
actually prosecutes. But Mr. Knight wanted to be
governor. This case would give him national expo-
sure. It was a career-maker. It gave him an
opportunity to fight communists, rapists, and
northerners all in one trial. What more could a
southern politician ask for?
Mr. Leibowitz began by moving that the indict-
ments be quashed because of the systematic
exclusion of blacks from both the grand jury and
the pool of trial jurors. He called to the stand the
editor of the local newspaper, who had to admit
that he had never seen or heard of a black person
sitting as a juror. For a day, witnesses testified.
Some were jury commissioners who denied dis-
crimination but could not remember a single black
person who had sat on the grand jury. Well-quali-
fied black citizens with college degrees testified
that they had never been called. Mr. Leibowitz’s
motion to dismiss was denied but now he had a
good record for appeal, should an appeal be
necessary.
The prosecution’s case was dependent essen-
tially on 1) the testimony of Victoria Price about
how she had been raped by Haywood Patterson
and the others—a story she had told four times in
the first set of trials; and 2) the medical testimony
of Doctors Bridges and Lynch that semen had
been found in Victoria Price and Ruby Bates. Mr.
Leibowitz would have to weaken the testimony of
these witnesses on cross-examination. Ruby Bates,
the younger alleged victim who had testified at the
first trials, had disappeared. The prosecution
couldn’t find her and would have to do without
her. It would be up to Victoria Price alone to
describe the rapes.
Miss Price testified that on the night before the
rape on the train, she had stayed with Ruby Bates
at Mrs. Callie Brochie’s 7th Ave. boardinghouse in
Chattanooga. She testified that she had hopped the
train the next morning and had been riding in an
open gondola car, sitting or lying on top of the
Mr. Leibowitz began by moving that the indictments be
quashed because of the systematic exclusion of blacks
from both the grand jury and the pool of trial jurors.
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cargo of gravel stones with some white youths.
Then, she claimed, a group of blacks had jumped
down from an adjoining tank car. The blacks had
thrown the whites off the train and then six blacks,
including the defendant, had raped her one after
another, brutally and constantly, until the train had
reached the posse at Paint Rock.
Mr. Leibowitz was convinced that Miss Price
was lying and set about to destroy her on cross-
examination. And he had the ammunition.
First, no one had been able to find Callie
Brochie or any such boarding house. Mr. Leibowitz
had a witness, Lester Carter, who would testify that
he had been with Vickie Price the day before she
boarded the train. Vickie’s boyfriend, one Jack
Tiller, Lester himself, and Ruby Bates had all spent
the night at a hobo swamp near the rail yards.
During that night, Lester would testify, “I had sex
on the ground with Ruby while Mr. Tiller had sex
with Vickie right next to us.” That, of course, was
crucial evidence. Not only would it show that
Victoria Price was a liar, but it would negate the
medical testimony by providing an alternative
explanation for the presence of semen.
Mr. Leibowitz wanted to go further and attack
Miss Price’s character, to show that she was no
flower of southern womanhood. In short, he
wanted to expose her as “white trash.” To some
extent, he did. Miss Price was somewhere around
21 years old, twice married, convicted and jailed
for adultery and fornication. Judge Horton prop-
erly excluded some of this evidence but the jury
heard some seamy details.
Mr. Leibowitz also intended to show that when
the defendants had been found, some of them had
been in railroad cars nowhere near the gondola car
where Miss Price claimed she had been raped. For
this purpose, Mr. Leibowitz had the Lionel Corpo-
ration construct an exact scale replica of the
original train. He would use it during his cross-
examination.
Mr. Leibowitz also planned to expose the sheer
absurdity of Miss Price’s testimony. Miss Price
testified that she had been forcibly raped by six
males without respite while lying on her back on
gravel stones. She claimed she had been hit on the
head. She had claimed at the previous trials that
she had been bleeding—that her back, her cut
head, and her genitals were bloody. This ordeal had
come to an end when the train had pulled into
Paint Rock. But Miss Price’s testimony of physical
injury was not supported by the physical evi-
dence—as the doctors who had examined her soon
after the alleged rapes would testify.
How, then, did the actual cross-examination go?
It depends on whom you ask. Victoria Price might
have been as Mr. Leibowitz saw her: a woman of
the underclass, a world of hoboes and casual sex.
She was certainly uneducated but just as certainly
“street-smart.” She was tough and fierce under
cross-examination. She absolutely refused to con-
cede anything, even the most basic facts.
Constantly, she answered by saying, “I don’t
know,” “I don’t remember,” “I won’t say,” “I can’t
say,” and “I didn’t pay attention to that.” She spat
out her answers, eyes flashing. She was evasive,
sarcastic, angry. And so it went. She vehemently
denied that she had had sex with her boyfriend the
night before the train ride. When asked if she had
ever been convicted of any offense, she answered,
“Absolutely not” in the face of court records of her
conviction for adultery and lewdness. When asked
how she explained the record, Miss Price said, “I
don’t, it’s wrong.” Usually, when witnesses say, “I
don’t know” or “I don’t remember,” they are de-
fensive. They try to explain why they don’t
remember. Their manner is apologetic. Not Vickie
Price. She was blatantly aggressive.
For three hours, Mr. Leibowitz dueled with this
witness. Was it an effective cross-examination? If a
witness refuses to answer, refuses to concede the
obvious, then the cross-examiner can’t get the
leverage he needs to expose lies. In that sense it was
frustrating for Mr. Leibowitz and not effective. But
if a witness denies knowledge of matters that the
witness must know, facts that any reasonable per-
son would remember, then the witness has
destroyed herself. No impartial person will believe
an obviously and consistently evasive witness. So,
Mr. Leibowitz wanted to go further and attack Miss
Price’s character, to show that she was no flower of
southern womanhood. To some extent, he did.
6 Cornell Law Forum
by any objective standard, the cross-examination
was very effective. Mr. Leibowitz asked the right
questions, and Miss Price’s refusal to answer should
have effectively discredited her. Mr. Leibowitz, the
ILD, and the northern press saw it just that way.
Headlines in news accounts said, “Victoria Price
Destroyed by Brilliant Cross-Examination.”
But the southern audience and the ones who
counted, the jurors, saw it differently. They were
furious at Mr. Leibowitz. Yes, Victoria Price was
not a model of southern womanhood. Yes, Victoria
Price might be a hobo, a drunk, a prostitute. Nev-
ertheless, the locals felt that “we don’t want a
Jewish lawyer from New York, especially one hired
by the Communist party, treating our women—
even our poor white trash—like this.” One
spectator in the courtroom was heard whispering to
another, “It’ll be a wonder if Leibowitz leaves town
alive.” An editorial in a Decatur newspaper spoke
for many locals when it wrote,
One possessed of that old southern chivalry
cannot read the trial now in progress in Decatur
and publish an opinion and keep within the
law. Mr. Leibowitz’s brutal cross-examination
makes one feel like reaching for his gun while
his blood boils to the nth degree.
Then came the testimony of Dr. Bridges—a key
part of the prosecution’s case. Dr. Bridges and his
colleague, Dr. Lynch, had examined Victoria Price
and Ruby Bates about 90 minutes after the alleged
rapes. As he had at the first trial, Dr. Bridges testi-
fied on direct that there had been semen in the
vaginas of Victoria Price and Ruby Bates. Dr.
Bridges was an honest witness. Because he was
honest, Mr. Leibowitz on cross-examination
turned him into a witness for the defense. When
Dr. Bridges examined the girls, Mr. Leibowitz
asked, what was their manner? Were they upset?
Were they crying? Were they hysterical? No, Dr.
Bridges said, they were completely composed and
calm. Dr. Bridges also acknowledged that although
Vickie Price had allegedly been raped repeatedly,
there was barely enough semen found to make a
smear slide. Dr. Bridges went on to explain that
the semen that was found was non-motile, or dead.
He conceded that these facts made Vickie Price’s
story of recent successive rapes unlikely because
spermatozoa normally live in the vagina for at least
12 hours and sometimes as long as two days. Miss
Price had testified that she had been bleeding from
her vagina and that her forehead had been cut. But
the doctor said there had been no visible signs of
blood.
Attorney General Knight this time did not call
Dr. Lynch to the stand. He explained to Judge
Horton that Dr. Lynch’s testimony would just
repeat Dr. Bridge’s statements; therefore, there was
no reason for the State to call him. So Dr. Lynch
did not testify.
Mr. Knight’s explanation for not calling Dr.
Lynch was not accurate. Some time later, Dr.
Lynch asked to speak to Judge Horton privately.
When they were alone, Dr. Lynch told Horton,
“Judge, these women were not raped. When I
examined them, I told them that they were lying
and they just laughed at me.”2 Judge Horton said,
“My God, you have got to testify.” Dr. Lynch said,
in substance, Judge, I can’t. I graduated from
medical school four years ago. I now have a fair
number of patients. If I testify for these boys I’ll
Mr. Leibowitz’s summation
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never be able to practice medicine in Jackson
County. I’ll have to start all over.3
Judge Horton was shaken. What should he have
done? Should he have forced Dr. Lynch to testify?
Judge Horton could have done so; as the judge, he
had the power to call witnesses. Or he could have
forced Dr. Lynch to repeat his assertion in the
presence of Mr. Knight and Mr. Leibowitz. That’s
what Judge Horton should have done—the defense
would then have called Dr. Lynch—but he
couldn’t bring himself to do it. Instead, Judge
Horton most likely consoled himself by thinking
that the strong defense case would result in an
acquittal. And after all, what Dr. Lynch had said
was not factual. It was one man’s opinion. So
Judge Horton did nothing—for now—and the trial
continued.
The testimony of Lester Carter further strength-
ened the defense case by providing the explanation
for the dead semen. He confirmed what Vickie
Price denied: that she had had sex with her boy-
friend, Jack Tiller, in the freight yard the night
before the train ride, at the same time that Ruby
Bates had had sex with Lester himself.
Then came the most dramatic mo-
ment of the trial: the defense’s final
witness. To the astonishment of every-
one, the courtroom doors opened and
in walked Ruby Bates, the missing
prosecution witness. Miss Bates, the
other alleged rape victim and Victoria
Price’s friend, stepped forward to testify
for the defense.
Under oath, Ruby Bates recanted all the testi-
mony she had given in the first set of trials. In
response to Mr. Leibowitz’s questioning, she testi-
fied that neither she nor Vickie Price had been
raped on the train. She explained that she had lied
before because Miss Price had told her that other-
wise they themselves might be jailed for crossing a
state line with men. Miss Bates confirmed that she
had had consensual intercourse in the railroad yard
with Lester Carter before boarding the train and
that, at the same time and place, Vickie Price had
had intercourse with Jack Tiller. Miss Bates also
denied Miss Price’s claim that they had spent the
night before the alleged attack in a Chattanooga
boarding house.
How was it that Ruby Bates disappeared from
view? Where had she been? Miss Bates explained
that she had gone to New York. She had visited a
minister there and told him about her lies. He had
urged her to return to Alabama and tell the truth.
One might imagine that Ruby Bates’s testimony
destroyed the State’s case. But it did not. The rea-
son was simple: almost no one believed her.
Mr. Knight’s cross-examination was devastating.
He extracted from Miss Bates admissions that her
beautiful clothes, her travel north, her lodging and
upkeep had all been paid for by what appeared to
be representatives of the Communist Party.
Mr. Knight succeeded in insinuating that Ruby
Bates had been bought and paid for by the ILD,
had been housed by them in New York City, and
had been enticed by communists and their New
York City lawyers into giving false testimony.
Either Mr. Leibowitz or the ILD had miscalcu-
lated badly. It was a mistake to overdress Ruby
Bates. It was a mistake to keep her in New York
rather than in Alabama. It was a mistake not to
prepare her better for cross-examination. Ruby
Bates, the surprise witness, was no help to the
defense.
The State’s summation was, in large part, an
appeal to prejudice. Defense witness Lester Carter
was referred to as “Carterinski,” a tool of the com-
munists. Ruby Bates had fallen under the influence
of New York Jewish communists. The assistant
prosecutor, Wade Wright, finished by exhorting
the jury to “Show them, show them that Alabama
justice cannot be bought and sold with Jew money
from New York.”4 Judge Horton scolded Mr.
Wright and Attorney General Knight was embar-
rassed, but the point was made.
Judge Horton’s charge to the jury was emi-
nently, completely fair. It was a plea for tolerance,
an effort to eliminate prejudice and to urge the jury
to decide the case on its merits, on the evidence.
Here are parts of what he said:
Take the evidence, sift it out and find the
truths and untruths and render your verdict. It
will not be easy to keep your minds solely on
the evidence. Much prejudice has crept into it.
Do not go off on side issues.
Judge Horton’s charge to the jury was a plea for
tolerance, an effort to eliminate prejudice and to
urge the jury to decide the case on its merits, on
the evidence.
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You are not trying whether or not the de-
fendant is white or black—you are not trying
that question; you are trying whether or not this
defendant forcibly ravished a woman.
You are not trying lawyers, you are not try-
ing state lines. You are here at home as jurors—
a jury of citizens under oath sitting in the jury
box taking the evidence and considering it, leav-
ing out any outside influences.
We are a white race and a Negro race here
together—we are here to live together—our
interests are together. The world at this time
and in many lands is showing intolerance and
hate. It seems sometimes that love has almost
deserted the human bosom. It seems that only
hate has taken its place. It is only for a time,
gentlemen, because it is the great things in life,
God’s great principles, matters of eternal right,
that long live. Wrong dies and truth forever
lasts, and we should have faith in that. Do your
duty.5
The judge’s charge was soothing. It probably
extended the jury deliberations by a few hours.
The jury was given the case on Saturday after-
noon. They returned this verdict on Sunday
morning: “We find the defendant, Haywood
Patterson, guilty as charged and fix the punishment
at death in the electric chair.” Just a few minutes
after getting the case the day before, the jury had
voted unanimously for a guilty verdict. It took
them until the next day to set the punishment
because one juror at first thought life imprison-
ment might be the more appropriate penalty.
Mr. Leibowitz was shocked. He had fully ex-
pected to win. Instead, he had lost, for the first
time in his career. The next day there were demon-
strations in the north. Mr. Leibowitz appeared
before a crowd of thousands in Harlem. The roar-
ing welcome seduced him into making unwise, rash
statements. Mr. Leibowitz was angry. He was re-
sentful. His ego required him to explain that the
verdict was not his fault. About the jury that had
convicted Haywood Patterson, he said, “If you ever
saw those creatures, those bigots whose mouths are
slits in their faces, whose eyes pop out like a frog’s,
whose chins drip tobacco juice, bewhiskered and
filthy, you would not ask how could they do it.”
And he followed this up by saying that two weeks
in Alabama made him feel that he needed a
“moral, mental and physical bath.”6
What a blunder! Mr. Leibowitz had eight other
clients still to be tried in the same courthouse
before the same community he had just thrashed.
His words were widely reported in the south,
particularly in Alabama. Newspapers quoted his
comments and reacted with angry editorials.
As luck would have it, Mr. Leibowitz’s insults
did not hurt his clients. Judge Horton postponed
the trials of the other defendants. He announced
that he did not know if Mr. Leibowitz had been
quoted accurately or not, but that the widespread
publicity and the angry community reaction indi-
cated that now was not the time to go ahead with
the other trials.
Judge Horton’s Decision
The Haywood Patterson trial was not yet finished.
The defense made a motion to set aside the jury
verdict, arguing that the verdict went against the
weight of the evidence.
Judge Horton was a decent man. He was, how-
ever, very much a southerner, steeped in southern
traditions. His ancestors had fought for the Con-
federacy in the Civil War. He had come up
through the system. He owed his position to his
support in the community. If he set aside the jury
verdict, he would not survive as a judge. He knew
that. After deliberating for weeks, he rendered his
decision.
Mr. Leibowitz had not convinced the jury. He
had not convinced the community. But he had
convinced Judge Horton, who began his decision
by noting that
Social order is based on law and its perpetuity
on its fair and impartial administration. De-
liberate injustice is more fatal to the one who
imposes it than to the one on whom it is im-
posed. The victim may die quickly and his suf-
fering cease, but the teachings of religion and
the uniform lesson of all history illustrate with-
out exception that its perpetrators not only
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pay the penalty themselves, but their children
through endless generations ….7
Point by point, Judge Horton dissected Victoria
Price’s testimony about the rape. If her account
were true, it would be easy to corroborate. But
there was no corroboration. She said she had been
cut and bleeding, but no one had seen blood. She
claimed she had been repeatedly raped. Examined
within one-and-a-half hours of these alleged as-
saults, she would be expected to have abundant
semen in her vagina. There were, however, no
physical signs of forcible intercourse, and the small
amount of dead sperm was more plausibly ex-
plained by the consensual intercourse that Lester
Carter testified Miss Price had had with her boy-
friend the night before she boarded the train. Judge
Horton found that the prosecution’s charges were
highly improbable. Rape is usually a crime com-
mitted secretly. Here the State would have us
believe that these rapes were committed on a
bright, clear day at about noon, on a gondola car
filled with gravel to within eighteen inches of its
top, and that the assaults continued in plain sight
as the train moved slowly through a succession of
country towns. The judge also noted that Victoria
Price, instead of testifying with candor and sincer-
ity, had been evasive on the witness stand and had
refused to answer pertinent questions.
Judge Horton concluded by stating,
The law declares that a defendant should not
be convicted without corroboration where the
testimony of the prosecutrix bears on its face
indications of improbability or unreliability,
and particularly when it is contradicted by other
evidence. The testimony of the prosecutrix in
this case is not only uncorroborated, but it also
bears on its face indications of improbability
and is contradicted by other evidence, and in
addition thereto the evidence greatly prepon-
derates in favor of the defendant. It therefore
becomes the duty of the court under the law to
grant the motion made in this case.
It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the
court that the motion be granted; that the ver-
dict of the jury in this case and the judgment
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of the court sentencing this defendant to death
be set aside and that a new trial is hereby or-
dered.8
It was probably Judge Horton’s hope that his
opinion would be so convincing, so logical, that
the State would decide to drop all charges and
would not continue the prosecution of the
Scottsboro youths. It was a vain hope. Neither the
state of Alabama nor Attorney General Knight was
ready to give up. Judge Horton’s career was over,
however. He was defeated in his next election a
year later and never again held public office.
Haywood Patterson was saved—at least for now.
But there would be a retrial.
New Judge, New Trials, Same Verdict
Attorney General Knight, using his political power,
had Judge Horton replaced as the trial judge. The
new judge was 70-year-old William Callahan.
In rapid succession, Haywood Patterson and
then Clarence Norris were retried. Mr. Leibowitz
again sought to dismiss the actions by reason of the
exclusion of blacks from the jury. All motions were
denied. Indeed, Judge Callahan systematically
undermined the defense presentations during these
trials. He overruled almost every defense objection.
He sustained almost every prosecution objection.
He excluded much of the defense case—whether or
not Mr. Knight objected.
A few examples: Judge Callahan refused to allow
any cross-examination of Victoria Price about her
background or the fact that she had had sex with
her boyfriend, Jack Tiller, the night before the
alleged attack; nor did the judge allow Lester
Carter to testify that he had seen Victoria Price
having sex with Jack Tiller. As a result, the jury
never had any alternative explanation for the semen
that had been found in Victoria Price and Ruby
Bates. These rulings were clearly erroneous and
they were devastating to the defense.
In his charge to the jury, Judge Callahan in-
structed them that they could “presume that no
white woman would ever have sex voluntarily with
a Negro.” He told the jury the form in which
they should report a guilty verdict. He neglected
to tell them how to report an acquittal. Both Mr.
Patterson and Mr. Norris were convicted and
sentenced to death.
Haywood Patterson was, for the third time, on
death row. For the second time, Clarence Norris
faced electrocution. Who could save them now?
All appeals through the Alabama courts failed. But
once again, the United States Supreme Court
rescued the defendants. On April 1, 1935, the
Court overturned the convictions of Patterson and
Norris, holding in Norris v. Alabama9 that the
systematic exclusion of blacks from sitting on
juries in this case was a denial of equal protection.
Norris v. Alabama was another landmark case.
Never again would the criminal justice system in
the south be the same. The significance of this
decision was not the legal principle itself; the
Court had held years ago that blacks could not be
systematically and arbitrarily excluded from juries.
But this principle was difficult, even impossible to
enforce because one had to prove systematic and
arbitrary exclusion. Before Norris v. Alabama it
was not enough to show that no blacks sat on
juries. It might be a coincidence or possibly a
result of no blacks wanting to serve or being
qualified to serve. It proved difficult to show a
discriminatory intent on the part of state officials
who made up jury lists. Heretofore, the Supreme
Court had been reluctant to meddle in state proce-
dures. It had been unwilling to look deeply into
the facts and to make reasonable assumptions on
the basis of the facts. Of course, if a state
commissioner of jurors were to admit racial dis-
crimination, then the Court would reverse
convictions. Understandably, that never happened.
In Norris v. Alabama, the Supreme Court re-
fused to accept the facts as found by the Alabama
appellate court. It said that the testimony showed
that no black person had served on a jury in recent
history, and that there were well-qualified black
people in Jackson County who had never been
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called to serve. That was enough to indicate dis-
criminatory exclusion.
Mr. Leibowitz successfully argued this appeal
before the Supreme Court. The oral argument was
unusual in one respect. It happened that in Jackson
County, the commissioner of jurors or one of his
staff had tried after the Scottsboro trials to add the
names of six black people to the
jury rolls. The inclusion of those
names would have shown that
blacks were not excluded from
consideration. Whoever at-
tempted this fraud had had to
squeeze the names into the small
space that was left on the page for
the year 1931. The forgery was blatant, obvious to
anyone who looked at it. During oral argument,
Mr. Leibowitz accused the State of having fraudu-
lently added the names. Can you prove that? asked
one of the Justices. Yes, your Honor, look at this—
and Mr. Leibowitz presented the 1931 Jackson
County jury roll to the Court. Each of the Justices,
one after another, looked at the relevant pages with
a magnifying glass while Mr. Leibowitz silently
waited to continue his
presentation. It was a decisive moment—and,
some say, the first time the Supreme Court was
presented with demonstrative evidence during an
oral argument.
Final Decisions
The rest of the story is anticlimactic. The state of
Alabama was tired of the Scottsboro cases. They
had been costly. They had earned Alabama terrible
publicity all over the world. Alabama wasn’t ready
to give up, but there was talk of compromise.
In 1936, again before Judge Callahan, Haywood
Paterson was convicted of rape for the fourth time.
His sentence was 75 years in jail. In the history of
the state of Alabama, this was the first time that a
black man found guilty of raping a white woman
had not been given the death penalty. Then, in
1937, Clarence Norris was convicted of rape and
sentenced to death. The governor commuted his
death sentence to life imprisonment. Charlie
Weems was convicted of rape and sentenced to 99
years. Ozzie Powell got 20 years for assaulting a
sheriff. Then, suddenly, all charges were dropped
against four other Scottsboro boys. At a press con-
ference, the prosecution team explained the release
of Eugene Williams, Roy Wright, Willie Roberson,
and Olen Montgomery:
After careful consideration of all the testi-
mony, every lawyer connected with the pros-
ecution is convinced that the defendants Willie
Roberson and Olen Montgomery are not
guilty.
The doctor that examined Willie Roberson
the day after the commission of the crime states
that he was sick, suffering with a severe vene-
real disease and that in his condition it would
have been very painful to have committed that
crime, and that he would not have had any
inclination to commit it. He has told a very
plausible story from the beginning: that he was
in a box car and knew nothing about the crime.
Olen Montgomery was practically blind and
has also told a plausible story, which has been
unshaken all through the litigation, which put
him at some distance from the commission of
the crime. The State is without proof other than
the prosecutrix as to his being in the gondola
car, and we feel that it is a case of mistaken
identity.
The prosecution team all entertain the same
view as to these two black people, and in view
of the doubt generated by the fact that their
physical condition was as stated above, we feel
that the policy of the law and the ends of jus-
It was a decisive moment—and, some say, the first
time the Supreme Court was presented with
demonstrative evidence during an oral argument.
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tice would not justify us in asking a conviction
of these two cases.
Two of the defendants were juveniles at the
time this crime was committed. According to
a careful investigation by the Attorney General’s
office, we are convinced that at the time of the
actual commission of this crime one of these
juveniles was 12 years old and the other one was
13, and while they were in the gondola car when
the rape was committed, counsel for the State
think that in view of the fact they have been in
jail for six-and-a-half years the ends of justice
would be met at this time by releasing these two
juveniles, on condition that they leave the state,
never to return.10
Gradually, over the course of the next ten years,
the imprisoned Scottsboro youths were paroled—
all except Haywood Patterson, who escaped.
Brutalized by years in prison, they had difficulty
adjusting to the outside world. Some violated pa-
role or committed other crimes and ended up back
in various jails. The only one who survived success-
fully was Clarence Norris. He moved to New York,
married, and got a steady job. He lived in freedom
for 45 years until he died in 1989 at age 76. But
before he died, Mr. Norris played a major part in
the final act of this story.
By 1976, all of the Scottsboro defendants were
dead except for Mr. Norris. That year, Mr. Norris
received a full pardon from the state of Alabama. A
major supporter of his pardon was the new Attor-
ney General of Alabama, William Baxley, who
wrote the governor to say, “My staff and I have
reviewed the Scottsboro case. We have concluded
that it is impossible that Victoria Price was raped as
she alleged.” Mr. Baxley urged the pardon board to
“swiftly grant to Clarence Norris a full and com-
plete pardon, which would remove the unjust
stigma of a crime that the overwhelming evidence
clearly shows he did not commit.” The governor
who signed the pardon and who personally deliv-
ered it to Clarence Norris was none other than
George Wallace. The pardon was a personal tri-
umph for Mr. Norris and also a reflection of how
much the south had changed. Alabama in 1976
was very different from Alabama in 1931.
The Scottsboro cases, the trials, the convictions,
the years of imprisonment—much of them spent
on death row—were a tragedy for the “Scottsboro
Boys,” for the south, and for the state of Alabama.
Did anything worthwhile come out of it? Lawyers
and historians point to two things. First, the
Scottsboro cases produced two landmark Supreme
Court decisions that advanced racial justice and
protected the rights of the accused. Second, it is
considered by some as a forerunner of the civil
rights movement. In the Scottsboro case, whites
joined blacks for the first time since the abolition
movement in demonstrating for racial justice. The
American Communist Party started the demon-
strations, but as the Scottsboro case continued in
the 1930s, Scottsboro defense leagues formed.
Whites and blacks, rich and poor, men and
women: the same kind of coalition that served
American society well in the 1960s and 1970s
came together to protest the inequities visited
upon the “Scottsboro Boys.”
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